Yellow Klyn is a vast historical region of the Volga area, where Ukrainians gradually settled over several centuries. This territory encompasses Astrakhan, Volgograd, Saratov, Samara, and Ulyanovsk regions, as well as parts of the Penza region, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Mordovia. Along with Malynovyi Klyn (Kuban), Grey Klyn (Omsk and Novosibirsk regions), and Green Klyn (the Russian Far East), Yellow Klyn forms a complex of Ukrainian ethnic territories within the Russian Federation.
The first wave of Ukrainian settlement in the Volga region was connected to the foreign policy of Russian tsarism in the 17th century. The vast southern borders of the Muscovite state needed strengthening to defend against raids by nomadic peoples of the Wild Fields, which caused significant damage to the feudal economy and hindered the tsars’ plans for territorial expansion to the east.[1] It was during this period that Ukrainian Cossacks, known locally as “Cherkasy” (not to be confused with the Circassians, an ethnic group from the Caucasus), first appeared in the Volga region. However, the participation of the Cherkasy in the region’s life did not develop further: some of them were assimilated into the Russian population, while others were sent to serve in the border regions of the empire.
In the second half of the 18th and early 19th centuries, on the opposite bank of the Volga River from Saratov, Cossacks and Chumaks founded several slobodas (settlements) and farmsteads, among which Pokrovska Sloboda (now the city of Engels) became the most significant. A new, much larger wave of Ukrainian colonization of the Volga region began in the mid-19th century. Hundreds of new settlements appeared in the area, founded by settlers from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Kharkiv governorates.
The mass migration of Ukrainians to the Volga region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was driven by a combination of socio-economic and demographic factors that worsened the situation in rural Ukraine. The main reason was the shortage of land resources: a significant portion of arable land belonged to landlords and the state. Large landowners preferred to lease land at high prices, making it inaccessible to poor peasants.
The defeat of the Russian Revolution of 1905–1907 became another contributing factor. The revolutionary events gave peasants hope for the redistribution of landlords’ estates, but these expectations were not fulfilled. After the suppression of the revolution, the situation of the peasants only deteriorated: taxes increased, repression against participants in peasant uprisings intensified, and the land issue remained unresolved. Under such conditions, mass migration to the East became for many peasants a way to escape poverty and landlessness.
Migration often took place as family or communal resettlement. Many Ukrainians moved to the Volga region with entire villages to preserve their traditional way of life, culture, and language. However, even under such conditions, settlers faced numerous difficulties: adapting to a new climate, combating diseases, lack of infrastructure, and the negative attitude of local Russian officials toward Ukrainian culture.[2]
Ukrainian resettlement in the Volga region at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen as a form of struggle for the preservation of national identity and decent living conditions. This struggle was not political in the conventional sense—it unfolded in the spheres of daily life, labour, culture, and education. Settlers faced harsh natural conditions: water shortages, poor soils, and a lack of necessary infrastructure. For example, in the village of Novokyivske (Penza region), residents suffered from the remoteness of the church, school, and other essential institutions.[3]
For Ukrainians in the Volga region, education in their native language became a key element of community survival and development. They actively sought to establish parish schools, often funding them themselves, and supported educational initiatives in every possible way.[4] These efforts reflected their desire to preserve both economic and cultural independence, despite pressure from Russian officials.
In public and political life, the situation was different. There were no political organizations of the Ukrainian population in the Volga region. The only form of protecting the Ukrainian language and traditions was the collection of folklore. Danilo Mordovtsev and Mykola Kostomarov played a significant role in this. Their work aimed to strengthen the Ukrainians of the Volga region in their awareness of national identity and connection to their native culture. The culmination of their efforts was the publication in 1859 in Saratov of the Little Russian Literary Collection, which included Ukrainian folk songs gathered among settlers, Kostomarov’s poetic works, and Mordovtsev’s poem The Cossacks and the Sea, where he sought to convey the spirit of Ukrainian folk poetry by turning to themes of the life and struggle of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks.
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, a political and cultural revival began among the Ukrainians of the Volga region, focused on the struggle for Ukrainization, which by the late 1920s became an important part of the region’s socialist transformations. However, this process was accompanied by fierce resistance both within the Ukrainian community and from external forces seeking to limit the development of Ukrainian culture and language. One of the key challenges was opposition from local authorities and teachers influenced by the ideology of Russian imperial chauvinism. For example, correspondence from the Vladimir district of the Lower Volga region mentioned cases where teachers forbade children from speaking Ukrainian, reflecting widespread resistance within the Soviet administrative apparatus. Moreover, in some areas, officials even denied the very existence of Ukrainians, referring to them as “Russified Khokhols.”
Ukrainization involved a broad range of initiatives: converting schools to the Ukrainian language, establishing Ukrainian theatres, museums, and newspapers.[5] However, due to the lack of a systematic approach and a shortage of personnel, the process moved slowly. In 1929, the Lower Volga region adopted a decision to fully convert Ukrainian schools to the native language, organize courses for Ukrainian teachers, and open Ukrainian departments in teacher-training colleges and universities. Yet the programme faced obstacles due to the lack of qualified specialists and the reluctance of some party organizations to recognize Ukrainians as a distinct national group.
Unfortunately, this policy was never fully implemented. In 1932, during the repression against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism,” a widespread rollback of Ukrainization began. Ukrainian schools were converted to Russian, and cultural institutions were closed or transformed into general Soviet ones. The policy of Ukrainization was criticized as allegedly fostering nationalism. This was especially evident in the Volga region, where Ukrainian educational institutions were almost completely destroyed.
During the interwar period, from 1923 to 1941, the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic existed. According to the 1926 census, 68,500 Ukrainians (almost 12% of the republic’s population) lived there. The constitution of the republic, adopted on 31 January 1926, provided for the use of three official languages—German, Russian, and Ukrainian. However, this constitution, like other constitutions of autonomous republics, was never approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.
A new revival of the Ukrainian community in the Volga region began in the 1990s but proved to be short-lived. The collapse of late-Soviet totalitarianism temporarily allowed the Ukrainian national-cultural movement in Russia to emerge from its oppressed state. Fellow-countrymen associations, educational organizations, and Ukrainian cultural autonomies began to appear in the regions. Ukrainian libraries and cultural centres opened in major cities. However, the general negative socio-economic situation in Russia, creeping Russification, and the mass migration of Ukrainians to their historical homeland led to a decline in the Ukrainian population from 4 million to 800,000 by early 2021. To this should be added a significant number of mixed families and a small Rusyn community, which Russian authorities regard not as a subethnic group of the Ukrainian people, but as a separate nation.
The most difficult time for Ukrainian associations came in the 2020s. Out of more than ten regional Ukrainian organizations in the Volga region that existed in the late 2010s, only two remain active today—one in Samara Oblast and one in Tatarstan. The main reason for their survival is complete loyalty to Russian state policy, the absence of any opposition, and full dependence on regional administrations.
For example, the Ukrainian National-Cultural Centre “Promin” in Samara Oblast published appeals to participate in the 2024 Russian presidential elections and materials supporting the official narrative regarding the anniversaries of the 2014 events in Crimea. As for activities aimed at preserving and promoting Ukrainian culture, the centre organized several concerts of Ukrainian choral music in towns of Samara Oblast.
Similarly, the “United Ukrainian National-Cultural Autonomy” of the Republic of Tatarstan operates along the same lines, carefully avoiding controversial political topics. Its activities are focused on organizing events dedicated to the interaction between the Ukrainian and Tatar peoples. Last year, with the support of this autonomy, a competition for the best recital of poetic works titled “The Word Resonating, the Word Alive” was held in Nizhnekamsk in honour of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko and classic Tatar writer Gabdulla Tukay. Educational events about the philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda are also organized. However, modern Ukrainian poets, writers, and thinkers are ignored by such organizations, which reflects a general trend among all the “surviving” Ukrainian organizations in Russia—they never go beyond Shevchenko.
The activities of the autonomy and fellow-countrymen associations cover only about 6–7% of Russia’s Ukrainian population. Residents of other regions, including ethnic Ukrainians, are almost completely deprived of opportunities to participate in events related to Ukrainian culture, literature, theatre, or music. This is because most Ukrainian organizations in Russia ceased operations out of perceived disloyalty, opposition, or the regional authorities’ fear of the very concept of Ukrainian culture.
The fate of the organization, Kobza – Ukrainians of Russia, is illustrative. Its website was one of the key resources dedicated to the life of Ukrainians in Russia and the Volga region. In March 2022, the Kobza website was blocked for readers in Russia, which sharply reduced its traffic. Moreover, the editorial board faced increasing difficulties in producing new materials, since Ukrainian cultural work in Russia became extremely difficult after 2022. As a result, the editorial team rebranded the site as Kobza – Ukrainians of the Diaspora, shifting its focus to Ukrainians connected to Russia but living abroad.
One might assume that discrimination against Ukrainians in Russia would be offset by support from nonprofit organizations, European cultural institutions, or Ukrainian educational and cultural foundations. However, in most cases, international institutions tend to view Russians as a monolithic group, without considering their national identities, which results in restrictions for everyone, including oppressed minorities. This approach appears unjust and only exacerbates the plight of Ukrainians in Russia.
Today, Ukrainian culture in Russia is in a critically dire situation. If the country continues along its current trajectory, the number of Ukrainian organizations will approach zero, and the number of people identifying themselves as Ukrainians will continue to decline. Unless urgent measures are taken—similar to the korenizatsiya (indigenization) policies of the 1920s—Ukrainian identity may completely disappear from all four Klyns, including the Volga region.
Borys Hunko
photo: Alarm at the Border Outpost / Source: wikipedia.org, public domain
The article was included in the book “Involuntary Annexation: The History of the Liberation Struggle of the Peoples Enslaved by Russia.”
[1] Lebedev M. A. Essays on the History of the Penza Region. Penza, 2008. 263 pages.
[2] Chernysheva N. I. Any Khokhols in the Village? Issue 14: Materials of the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference / general editor N. P. Berlyakova, Penza, 2016. 218 pages.
[3] Penza Diocesan Gazette. Penza, 1914, No. 11.
[4] Bystrov N. F. New Peasant Farms in the Penza Province: (Notes of a Traveler). Penza: Published by the journal “Zemleustroitel,” 1911.
[5] Ostrovsky Z. The Problem of Ukrainization and Belarusization in the RSFSR. Moscow, 1931, p. 74.
