In 2015, taking advantage of the operational pause in Ukraine by signing Minsk II and freezing the war (Putin needed to digest the occupied territories and prepare troops for a full-scale conventional war with Ukraine), Putin transferred troops to Syria and, from a regional troublemaker, swung to a geopolitical player.
Putin raised his geopolitical status by making Syria a stronghold for expansion in the Middle East and Africa. Later, he turned it up a notch by blatantly trampling on the Monroe Doctrine by meddling in Venezuelan affairs.
Militarily, Syria has become a good training ground for conventional warfare.
While military depots were being blown up with impunity in Ukraine, and the authorities were fighting cynical Bandera volunteers, Putin conducted combat coordination of all branches of the armed forces using the entire range of weapons, including ground-based, air-based, and sea-based missiles, and drove the entire officer corps, right down to brigade commanders, through Syria.
Ultimately, Putin launched his hybrid world war against democratic countries, constantly demonstrating his desire to divide the world into three and get his piece of the zone of inviolable exclusive geopolitical interests.
When Ukraine jumped off the lethal injection of the Minsk agreements – an analogue of the Ilovaisk – only now diplomatic, Putin, based on his incorrect assessments of the Ukrainian nation’s ability to resist with the tacit consent of the world community, shifted the war from hybrid to large-scale, constantly demonstrating that he would capture Ukraine regardless of the losses and consequences.
And so, at the end of the third year of the war, geopolitical tensions began to take their toll.
Syria, the key to raising its geopolitical status, fell almost as instantly as Afghanistan.
Now Russia may lose not only a transshipment naval base and airfields in a key region but also its reputation as a reliable support for any ally.
So, Russia’s tentacles of advancement in Africa may be cut off, just like the defile in Libya.
And Russia does not have the strength and means to stop this decline.
Moreover, Russia may lose its position as a regional player.
That is, it cannot, but it must.
During the war with Ukraine, Russia was unable to stop the disarmament of the time-lapse mines of the Karabakh conflict.
It not only lost this lever of influence in the Caucasus but also Armenia as an ally and member of the CSTO.
Azerbaijan will not perform this function.
It simply took advantage of Russia’s weakness and concluded a one-time “commercial” agreement.
Because Russia’s actions are a step of desperation, not connected to any positive strategy, while Azerbaijan is acting in the force field of the pan-Turkism strategy.
This will ultimately be a serious challenge for Russia not only in Syria or the Caucasus but also across a significant part of the territory of the Russian Federation.
Kazakhstan is also currently a situational ally that would rather choose the fate of vassalage to China than constant threats from the former colonialist.
The world has a chance to deprive Russia of any influence not only on geopolitical processes but also the ability to destabilize the situation at the regional level.
It’s time to drive the rabid bear into its den.
What do I think needs to be done for this?
First, Moldova must resolve the Transnistrian issue. The easiest way to do this is to cooperate with Ukraine and ensure that the indigenous population (mostly ethnic Ukrainians) will receive autonomous status.
If Moldova does not do this now, Transnistria, together with Gagauzia, will remain a serious security problem.
Second, Georgians must put an end to the political occupation of their country.
Third. The fiction of the presidential elections scheduled in Belarus at the end of January 2025 should end with the running of the “Kalinovsky regiment” and successful observation at all polling stations.
The Belarusian front of the Russian-Ukrainian war is a security and existential issue for the Baltic countries as well.
This is ultimately an opportunity to push the Russian fist away from Central European countries.
If anyone thinks that Lukashenko’s 30-year regime is made of reinforced concrete and that Russia’s aid is omnipotent, remember Syria.
Of course, all this can be done only in a short geopolitical window of opportunity and on the condition that Ukraine does not stop shooting until at least the end of January 2025, but increases pressure and does not allow Putin to direct his efforts anywhere.
In the event of the loss of Belarus (and I believe that with the right goal setting, this is possible), Ukraine will remain the last place of Russian presence in the post-Soviet space.
And the more and the deeper it gets trapped in Ukraine, the harder it will be for it to recover.
But even a weakened and wounded bear driven into a den remains very dangerous.
Therefore, instead of honey for storage and recovery, a swarm of hornets should be waiting in the bear’s den.
The loss of geopolitical greatness could become a catalyst for explosive processes in the country.
Blind and helpless rebellion among the Russians, meaningful national liberation revolutions of the nations enslaved by Russia…
Ukraine, instead of a point of ascent, becomes a zero point for the country 404…
The main thing is to keep shooting 🙂
