Russia has suddenly “become active” on the topic of negotiations — and this is not about goodwill. It’s about money. In just the first seven months of this year, the federal budget deficit of the Russian Federation reached 4.88 trillion rubles (~$61 billion) — already exceeding the annual plan, which was initially three times smaller. War expenses are consuming 41% of the budget, even as oil and gas revenues in July fell by 19% compared to last year.
Reserves are also melting away: the liquid assets of Russia’s National Welfare Fund have shrunk to 2.8 trillion rubles (~$36 billion) — down 71% from the pre-war level, with experts predicting that by 2026 this “wallet” could be empty. To plug the gap, the government is accelerating the issuance of government bonds — just in the first half of the year, 2 trillion rubles worth were issued, at a Central Bank rate of 20%, which hits banks and businesses hard.
We’ve seen this before. The end of the USSR was marked by a combination of an exhausting war in Afghanistan, falling oil prices, budget deficits, technological isolation, and bloated military spending. The result — cuts in social spending, inflation, stagnation, political concessions abroad, and ultimately, the collapse of the imperial project. Today’s Russia is on the same trajectory: the longer the war lasts, the more expensive it is to service, and the narrower the fiscal room for maneuver becomes.
Our task is to push harder economically. The good news: the tools already exist in the U.S. Congress, and some are advancing in this session. Specifically, we support and promote:
1. Confiscation of frozen Russian assets (REPO/analogues) — seizing Russian sovereign assets and directing them to Ukraine’s reconstruction.
2. Secondary sanctions against the “shadow fleet” — modelled on the Iran precedent, cutting them off from the dollar and correspondent accounts.
3. Sanctions on Rosatom and the development of alternative uranium cycles in the U.S.
4. Restrictions on metals, the military-industrial complex, and high-tech goods — with sanctions on intermediaries in third countries.
5. Banking pressure — expanding sanctions on semi-state entities and foreign banks servicing Russia’s war operations.
6. Strengthening enforcement — funding OFAC, BIS, and other agencies to detect and block sanctions evasion.
What does this achieve? Less revenue — less “fat” for the front. More expensive money in the system — deeper decline in civilian sectors. Depleted reserves — more borrowing at high rates, risk of inflation spikes, and social discontent. These factors are already forcing Moscow to look for “exits” and create a real window of opportunity for Ukraine.
Our current steps:
• Targeted advocacy in Congress: NDAA, appropriations, REPO, shadow fleet — working with bill sponsors and building a bipartisan coalition.
• Coordination with the EU and G7 for synchronized pressure (more to follow).
• Sanctions evasion analysis and passing the data to congressional offices for official inquiries.
The conclusion is simple: Russia is showing a willingness to talk because the bill for the war has become unbearable. Our task is not to let that bill shrink. Apply pressure through sanctions, asset confiscation, and uncompromising enforcement — so that the Kremlin has no option left but to end the war.
Oleksiy Taran
Facebook 
