The analytical findings of the study include: restrictions on political competition, pressure on observers, and transparency issues.
As part of a research project at the University of Free Peoples, the Tatarstan Independence Committee conducted an analysis of the 2026 election campaign, focusing on how the elections were conducted in the Republic of Tatarstan.
The purpose of the study is to document specific episodes that can be independently verified.
The report included information from open sources, reports from participants in the electoral process, photographs and videos from polling stations, eyewitness recordings, statements from candidates and observers, as well as documents and other materials that made it possible to compare individual reports with each other.
It is fundamental that the study distinguishes:
Directly recorded facts—photos, videos, and documents;
testimonies of participants in the events;
open-source reports;
and analytical conclusions based on the collected materials.
This approach avoids both exaggerating individual cases and ignoring them.
1. The exclusion of Yabloko from the federal election campaign
One of the most significant events of the 2026 election campaign was the exclusion of the Yabloko party from the federal part of the elections.
On August 10, 2026, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation annulled the registration of the Yabloko party’s federal list of candidates, preventing the party from participating in the elections on the federal list. The court’s decision addressed, among other issues, campaign financing and the use of intellectual property.
However, the restrictions for party representatives in Tatarstan did not end there.
On August 31, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the claim of the territorial electoral commission for Naberezhnye Chelny single-mandate constituency No. 34 and deregistered Yabloko candidate Airat Gumerbaev. This fact was also recorded by the party’s regional branch.
Thus, even before election day, there was a consistent reduction in the opportunities for Yabloko representatives to participate in the electoral process – first at the federal level, and then in relation to individual candidates in Tatarstan.
2. Pressure on Yabloko representatives and observers
Cases of pressure on candidates, party representatives and observers directly during the voting period occupy a special place in the study.
Sofya Fedorova – removed from polling station #405
On September 20, Yabloko observer Sofya Fedorova was removed from polling station #405.
The removal was recorded on video. The regional branch of the Yabloko party also reported the incident. According to the published information, the removal was caused by the observation of the incident from an observer’s position.
This episode is of fundamental importance, as the issue is not only the conflict itself, but also the legality of depriving the observer of the opportunity to continue observing the election process. Independent publications also point to Yabloko’s announcement that the observer was removed from the polling station.
For the purposes of this study, this case falls into the category of episodes with direct visual fixation.
Ruslan Zinatullin – attack near a polling station
Another serious incident was the attack on the chairman of the Tatarstan branch of Yabloko, Ruslan Zinatullin.
According to the party and independent sources, the conflict occurred near polling station No. 254 in Kazan, and Zinatullin himself reported a physical attack and the intention to confiscate his personal mobile phone. This incident is being considered separately from the procedural violations at the polling stations, as it involves physical violence against a campaign participant. This incident was recorded on video by a first-person viewer, that of Ruslan Zinatullin.
Azat Shaekhov – detention and obstruction of observation
On September 20, observer Azat Shaekhov was taken by police from polling station No. 135 in Kazan.
According to reports from the party and the human rights project OVD-Info, he was taken to the police station after a conflict at the station.
The subsequent question of whether the observer can return to his duties requires special attention. After his release, Azat Shaekhov was unable to return to the polling station and continue observing the vote count. According to a video recording from his personal archive, published publicly, he knocked on the station door and asked for it to be opened, but was not allowed in.
3. Irina Nikiforova: pressure on an observer in the Zelenodolsk district
A separate episode occurred in the Zelenodolsk district with Irina Nikiforova.
According to reports published during the voting period, Nikiforova was supposed to be monitoring the polling station (Poll No. 2822, Osinovo village, Zelenodolsk district). However, after a group of men appeared and threatened to damage her phone, she refused to continue her work as an observer. This was reported by independent sources, citing information from Dmitry Rumyantsev, among others.
This case is of particular interest because the pressure was exerted not through a formal decision by the electoral commission, but through the creation of a physically unsafe situation for the observer.
The study examines this episode as an example of possible coercive pressure on independent observation. However, information about who specifically organized the group of men’s appearance and whether anyone gave such an order should be considered separately and only to the extent supported by documents or primary materials.
4. The role of public observers
Special attention during the study was paid to the behavior of observers sent by the Public Chamber.
Formally, public observers are supposed to independently monitor compliance with electoral legislation. On election day, Alexander Terentyev, Chairman of the Civic Chamber of the Republic of Tatarstan, publicly emphasized that public observers do not represent the interests of specific parties or candidates and should advocate for fair and honest elections.
This is why the cases of behavior of individual public observers recorded in the research materials require separate analysis.
According to materials collected by the Tatarstan Independence Committee, at some polling stations, observers from the Public Chamber did not limit themselves to passively observing the proceedings, but instead entered into conflicts with Yabloko representatives, created situations that participants regarded as provocative, and engaged in actions that complicated the work of independent observers.
The institutional context deserves special attention.
Alexander Terentyev, Chairman of the Tatarstan Civic Chamber, has extensive experience working directly in the domestic policy sphere of the Republic of Tatarstan. From 2006 to 2012, he headed the Tatarstan Presidential Directorate for Domestic Policy, and then headed the Tatarstan Presidential Department for Domestic Policy until 2022. In January 2026, Terentyev was elected Chairman of the Tatarstan Civic Chamber.
Thus, we are talking about a person with many years of experience in the domestic policy management system and directly related to the organization of political processes.
This fact alone does not prove the interdependence of public observers or the existence of coordination among their actions. However, in the context of the incidents recorded at the polling stations, it is of significant institutional interest and requires separate study.
5. An observer may be formally present but unable to observe
One of the most significant issues identified during the study is the difference between the observer’s formal presence at the site and his actual ability to observe.
According to numerous reports from participants, which inspire confidence, observers were stationed at a significant distance from the counting site in some areas – reportedly around 20–30 meters.
It is important to emphasize here that with this arrangement, an observer may be physically present in the room but not be able to discern the marks on the ballots or even read the names of the candidates.
This is a fundamentally important point.
Observation isn’t just about being present in the same room. Its purpose is to be able to directly observe and control the procedure.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate not only the number of observers allowed, but also the actual conditions under which they were given the opportunity to observe the voting and vote counting.
6. Warnings and pressure even before election day
Pressure on representatives of opposition parties and independent activists was exerted not only at the polling stations.
The study pays special attention to official warnings issued to activists in connection with the possible holding of public events.
In particular, Dmitry Rumyantsev received an official warning regarding the inadmissibility of violating laws on public events, including picketing.
A warning in itself does not constitute proof of illegality on the part of law enforcement. However, in the context of an election campaign, such documents are of interest as part of a broader system of restrictions on public political activity.
Therefore, the report examines such cases together with other instances of pressure, but does not legally confuse them with various procedures, such as warnings, detention, the removal of observers, and judicial removal of candidates, which are different types of interference and require separate legal assessment.
7. Administrative mobilization of students
A separate area of research was the numerous reports about possible administrative incentives for students to participate in voting.
There were reports that students from various educational institutions in Tatarstan were “recommended” to participate in the elections, and information about the fact of voting was supposed to be passed on to the heads of their study groups.
According to participants, various methods of influence were used, from promises of assistance and benefits to warnings about the possible consequences of refusal.
It is fundamentally important to distinguish between simply informing citizens about elections and forcing them to participate in them.
If a citizen is asked to report voting, and refusal is accompanied by a threat of negative consequences or a promise of benefits for complying with the request, the question arises as to whether such a practice complies with the principle of free expression of will.
8. “Election Festival”: fairs, entertainment and material incentives
One of the persistent features of election campaigns in Tatarstan is the creation of a festive atmosphere around the “voting procedure”.
In various regions of the republic, fairs, concerts, music and refreshments were held on voting days, and various events were organized.
In 2026, additional incentives were also announced—free travel on election day in Nizhnekamsk, a car raffle, and various promotions for citizens who voted.
In Naberezhnye Chelny, voters were offered the opportunity to take a photo with a “bracelet” given to them after the voting process, including with family members, for a chance to win the prize.
Such events, in and of themselves, are not proof of election fraud. However, from an analytical perspective, it is important to consider them within the overall system of voter turnout management.
Combined with administrative mobilization, pressure on independent observers, and other identified practices, they form a broader picture of how the electoral process was organized.
9. Absence of the “against all” line.
In the 2026 State Duma elections, there was no separate “against all” line on the ballot.
This option is not provided for by law in federal elections. The “against all” option may be used in cases provided by law in municipal elections, but not in State Duma elections.*
In the context of 2026, this takes on additional significance: a voter who does not support any of the parties represented does not have a separate box to express precisely that position.
However, the absence of such a line is a feature of the current legislation and not a violation of electoral legislation.
10. General assessment of the identified trends
The materials collected during the study allow us to identify several interrelated areas.
The first is the restriction of political competition even before election day.
The Yabloko party was disqualified from participating in the elections on the federal list following a ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Tatarstan, candidate Airat Gumerbaev’s registration was also revoked following a ruling by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan.
The second is pressure on party representatives and independent observers.
The removal of Sofia Fedorova from polling station No. 405, the detention of Azat Shaekhov, the attack on Ruslan Zinatullin, and the pressure on Irina Nikiforova are all different episodes, but they all occurred within the same election period.
Thirdly, the problem is not only the admission of observers, but also the quality of the observation itself.
Even with the formal presence of an observer, his or her capabilities may be limited by distance, prohibitions or obstacles to recording what is happening, conflicts, or removal from the area.
Fourth, the activities of public observers require separate assessment.
If a public monitoring representative enters into conflict with an independent observer, initiates controversial actions, or participates in situations that bear the hallmarks of provocation, this should be verified using primary materials. It is especially important to establish a pattern of such behavior at polling stations.
Fifth, the presence of force and administrative forces has become a noticeable part of the electoral environment.
Reports of police action, detentions, warnings and pressure should not be analysed in isolation, but in conjunction with the possibility of independent observation and the free conduct of political activity.
Conclusion
The 2026 elections in Tatarstan should not be assessed solely by the final turnout figures and vote distribution.
To assess the quality of the electoral process, it is necessary to consider the entire cycle—the admission of candidates, the registration of parties, the pre-election activities, the possibility of observation, the working conditions of observers, the conduct of electoral commissions, the intervention of law enforcement agencies, and the vote counting procedure.
Monitoring of the electoral process in Tatarstan was carried out at all key stages: before voting, during the three days of voting, and afterward. Information on the target areas of the study was collected using methodological materials prepared by the University of Free Peoples. As part of the preparation and implementation of the study, the University of Free Peoples organized consulting work aimed at identifying priority monitoring areas, systematizing the collected data, and assessing the identified incidents.
Specifically, the Tatarstan Independence Committee team applied the Shpilkin method of mathematical and statistical analysis to collect data, based on electronic data from the independent web service Vyboroteka, comparing it with reports from the GAS Vybory system. Anomalies were identified, including a significant, clearly inflated increase in votes for the United Russia party in districts such as the Apastovsky and Baltasinsky districts. These districts recorded “anomalous” voter turnout of over 90%, where the entire mathematical increase in “electoral votes” went exclusively to United Russia (over 81%), while votes for other parties completely “stagnated.”
There were also cases of political and electoral technologies being used to distort voting results and manipulate voter behavior, which were divided into two categories:
1- Administrative and organizational methods:
— mobilization of a dependent electorate (coercion of employees of the public sector, large industrial enterprises and the “tertiary sector of the economy” of the republic, such as tourism, trade, banks, IT companies, etc.).
— removal of candidates based on formal grounds.
— the use of the “Drying” method—using the decline in interest in elections on the part of (independent) voters to ensure the turnout of only voters loyal to the government, for example, public sector workers.
2- Direct electoral manipulation.
This approach made it possible to consider individual events not in isolation, but in the context of broader processes that accompanied the preparation and conduct of the elections.
During the 24-hour monitoring conducted by the Tatarstan Independence Committee throughout the entire electoral process, which took place across the Republic, and based on materials from personal sources, as well as regional Telegram channels, including closed groups in all cities of the Republic of Tatarstan (particularly in closed city community networks), Facebook groups, and publications on the VKontakte social network in “in-group” communities and local closed “communication clubs,” hundreds of reports of possible violations and other incidents related to the electoral process were identified.
However, not all identified reports were included in this report. Some publications were subsequently removed from their original sources, and at the time of preparation, no available evidence was available to reliably establish the circumstances of the relevant incidents. In such cases, including information in the report was not possible without the risk of relying on information that could not be independently verified.
The report included only those incidents for which a robust evidence base was established, accessible for independent verification, and publicly available. The selection of materials took into account the availability of specific evidence, including photographs, video recordings, documents, and other materials that allowed us to establish the location, time, cause, and circumstances of the incident.
Therefore, the list presented in the report does not exhaust all reports of possible violations identified during monitoring. It reflects those cases for which a verifiable evidence base was available at the time of preparation of the study.
* The “against all” option was removed from Russian ballots in 2006 by Federal Law No. 107-FZ of July 12, 2006. Previously, voters could use this option, including in State Duma elections. In 2014, the “against all” option was reinstated for municipal elections, but it remains unavailable for federal elections.
This material was prepared by the Tatarstan Independence Committee.
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