Russia is indeed increasing its military and organisational activity in the Transnistrian region of Moldova. According to the information available today, mobilisation measures have been intensified there, weapons are being decongested, and the production of UAVs and training of drone operators are being deployed.
Is this a direct military threat?
In my opinion, in the classical sense of a “second front,” no. The existing grouping of Russian forces in the Transnistrian Republic is not enough for large-scale offensive actions against Ukraine. The necessary logistics for a covert build-up of the contingent are also lacking.
What is the real danger:
● Diversion of Ukraine’s resources.
Moscow seeks to force Kyiv to keep additional forces in the southern direction – this is a typical element of the distraction strategy.
● Hybrid threats.
PMR can be used as:
– base for sabotage groups,
– a logistics hub for agent work,
– a platform for provocations near the border with the Odessa region.
● Drone factor.
Training operators and assembling UAVs in the region poses a risk of:
– reconnaissance of the border areas of Ukraine,
– pinpoint strikes or provocations,
– testing new tactics without the direct responsibility of the Russian Federation.
● Pressure on Moldova as an indirect threat to Ukraine.
The destabilisation of Chisinau, intimidation with drones and mobilisation rhetoric are part of a broader Russian game on Europe’s southern flank.
Based on this, the following possible scenarios can be considered:
● Basic (most likely):
– hybrid pressure,
– information operations,
– sabotage activity,
– demonstrative “mobilisation”.
● Escalation:
a series of border incidents and drone provocations to create a sense of threat.
● Large-scale offensive from the Transnistrian Republic:
unlikely under current conditions.
To close this topic for today, let’s consider a realistic assessment of the presence of armed forces in the PMR as of now. This is an assessment of potential, not formally declared numbers.
● Russian military contingent in the Transnistrian Republic (formally, the Russian Federation calls it the Operational Group of Russian Forces):
• 1200 – 1500 people actually
of them:
~ 300-400 – warehouse security in Kobasna;
~ 600-800 so-called “peacekeepers;
~ the rest – staff, communications, technical personnel, special services.
It is important to understand that this is an isolated group, without rotation, without reinforcements from the Russian Federation, with limited resources, the main personnel of which are local residents who received Russian passports and signed a contract with MO Russia.
● Armed formations of the so-called PMR (local forces):
Permanent staff of 4000 – 4500 people:
~ motorised rifle units;
~ artillery units;
~ air defence units (obsolete);
~ special forces of the “MDB PMR”.
● Reserve/“mobilisation resource”:
~ 10,000 – 15,000 people on paper,
really combat-ready:
~ 2000 – 3000, maximum.
mostly:
people 40–55+, minimal training, low motivation
It is these people who are now being “summoned” under the guise of a meeting.
● Armament (qualitative assessment)
Armoured vehicles:
• up to 20–30 units (APCs, BMPs, partially faulty)
Artillery:
• towed artillery of Soviet design;
• MLRS type BM-21 “Grad” (limited)
• Air defence:
ZU-23-2,
MANPADS of old modifications are not able to withstand modern air attack weapons
● Warehouses in Kobasna:
tens of thousands of tons of ammunition
a significant part of which:
• overdue,
• unstable,
• dangerous for transportation
What are they all together:
● They can actually do:
• sabotage organizations, DRGs;
• provocations at the border;
• local shelling/incidents;
• drone activity (reconnaissance, training);
• information operations + intimidation.
● Cannot:
• conduct offensive combat operations against Ukraine;
• hold the front;
• carry out air-ground operations;
• to fight for a long time without external supplies.
I want to emphasise once again that the Russian Federation’s activation in Transnistria is a tool of pressure and distraction, not preparation for a major war in a new direction. Moscow’s main goal is to force Ukraine and its partners to react to an additional “point of tension” without opening a full-fledged front.
Viktor Yahun
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