Russian politics sagged on the eve of a gloomy booth. The authorities turned naive people into sign queues. We trampled on hopes for Nadezhdin with gusto (does anyone else remember this last name?). “You don’t need a knife to kill a fool,” they threw it in the faces of hundreds of thousands. They sadistically regulated grief for Alexei Navalny: cry as indicated. A pre-election triumph of will. But the post-Avdeevsky frontline plug, the Belgorod-Kursk tank breakthrough of the LSR and RDK, unmanned strikes and oil explosions broke the script. This is where the power of the Kremlin ends. Life lives on. But only this.
There still remains a certain meaning behind the voting ritual. Not, of course, in the sense that it is possible to express some kind of “protest” or “show how many of us there are.” The owners didn’t care about your paper protests or how many of you there were. But the special event on 17 March affects inter-host situations.
We are not talking about the notorious “silibs” – they do not exist as a political factor. There is a qualified technical service that ensures the cash flow of the ruling security forces. Not about some “moderates” who are supposedly dissatisfied with Putin. This doesn’t exist either. An elite consensus of war and dictatorship developed around the leader. A simple effect works: it’s too late to drink Borjomi. “They knew that only victory could free them from responsibility for what they had done. Therefore, they clung to the illusion of victory and to the system that promised to bring it,” historian Alexander Galkin described the mentality in the Third Reich of 1944–1945. Now they see the way out of all the difficulties by cheating the tin.
The Kagarlitsky case is symbolic in this regard. Inspired by the leniency of the first sentence, a fine instead of a term (“if you are not guilty of anything at all, then a year of probation”), he gave out optimistic comments. He hinted at some high-ranking bosses who only dream of slowing down the repressions. The rest is known. An illustrative case.
The notorious “split of the elites” is real. However, the elites are not split according to political programs. And regarding the eternal Russian question: who is in charge? No sudden movements should be expected. The fate of Prigozhin taught him seriously and for a long time. But let us remember how three or four years ago there was a departmental war for the position of first deputy director of the FSB. The “economists” (on disciplining the elites) and the “punishers” (on political repression) fought. The first were considered moderate. They won. Bortnikov’s first deputy was Korolev from the anti-corruption unit. A year later, full-scale hostilities began and the repressive wave turned into a state of terror. Did the king’s “moderation” greatly interfere with all this? But it is the first deputy, given the director’s difficult psychophysical condition, who determines the specifics of state security.
The war, externally and internally, did not split, but consolidated the ruling elite of the Russian Federation. Putin’s course as a whole reflects its class interests, worldview and psychological characteristics. New opportunities have been created to improve status, increase income, and show ambition. Short-term benefits have been thrown at a significant part of the population (from rising wages in military production to basic “coffin” benefits, in an embrace with frets and dumplings). After 17 March, the policy of war and repression will continue and become more severe. In the eyes of the ruling class, it justified itself. Simply put, the owners love it all.
One can, however, predict a post-election surge in behind-the-scenes contention. During the continuation of the ritual complex, it is possible to change the office. The pushed Zolotov can become more active. Patrushev, relying on the punitive apparatus, will consolidate his position as number two, pushing Shoigu further away. Volodin will respectfully try to remind you of the political instructor-propaganda corps. Business oligarchs and regional administrators habitually look to successful Kremlin towers. Here, by the way, is a fairly accurate indicator – what Beglov’s circles with icons are worth.
Endless prolongation of the war is acceptable for the kremlyadi (kremlin leaders). It creates a suitable environment for power. Let it be from a different, not victorious end. There is only one thing they cannot afford – another defeat, like in the spring and autumn of 2022 (“I agree with you. Proceed with the withdrawal of troops”). Russian raids in the border areas, drone strikes on administrations – in the same series. This is a piercing blade. You can’t get up from this.
This means that the militarization of the economy will accelerate and pull all public spheres with it. The grave obscurantism will stretch through every window. KGB repressions will intensify. Police control will tighten. Online discussions, the last outlet for “handshakes,” are being criminalized. All types of protests are finally blocked (“We only meet in courts,” from the sighs after the passage of the convoy).
Building a domestic opposition agenda under these conditions may seem pointless. But such reasoning is wrong. Quite the contrary: it’s high time to focus on what is necessary, cutting off what is unnecessary.
Accept war as a fact that strictly determines all forms of opposition activity. Become part of the Ukrainian military infrastructure, Russian front-line volunteerism and the partisan movement. This should have been done ten years ago – after Crimea and Donbas there could be no doubt about the essence of what was happening. But better late than never.
Let us understand: outside of the war – not two years, but already ten years – there is and was nothing. Neither in politics nor in morality. Throw away shameful toys like “ afternoon tea against Putin .” Recognize any “institutional” thinking outside the military-guerrilla paradigm as a political dead end and human immorality (the mildest of appropriate expressions). To put it bluntly: speeches of this kind – whether for Davankov or for “sleeping institutions” – are either work for the enemy or special talent. The conclusion is obvious in both cases.
Only direct participation or substantive support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteer formations and the Russian underground gives any significance and the right to be heard. Such opportunities exist both in Russia and emigration. It is not even associated with instant reprisals. But one way or another, everything else is emptiness.
Help for Ukraine is clear. Russian partisanship is more complicated. Not in moral and political terms – everything is just as clear here. But in operational-tactical terms. Serious military operations—liquidation of war criminals, attacks on military-economic targets—are carried out with obvious organization. Spontaneous actions from the depths of the people are a different matter.
A new factor has just emerged Navalny’s “military detachments” announced attacks on election commissions. Whatever it turns out to be, the symbolism is already positive – the connection of Navalny’s name with something real, and not with legalistic sludge. Other underground structures have been known for many years; it’s hard to imagine.
Ideological insurrection is the best thing in Russia. But by definition, there is never too much of a better one.
Something very new is being formed. For many it is repulsive. But it’s real. The anti-power anger of the marginalized and criminals. There is no reason to give philosophical and ethical assessments to this. There is a social fact.
“Don’t explain. I don’t give a fuck about politics. I just know what kind of scum Vova Putin is,” from a real conversation in a back alley that had consequences. It is not for nothing that the “AUE movement” is banned in the Russian Federation – the Ministry of Internal Affairs considered it a “combat reserve of protest personnel.” Targeted operations against shadow communities and torture experiments in places of detention are not accidental. The regime sees a threat in any alternative verticals, especially those with power potential. Especially of an extra-legal nature. And it strikes proactively.
Let’s look realistically. Adapted social strata in modern Russia are tightly controlled by the authorities. Administratively, economically, and ideologically. They are not ready for an uprising, and that is putting it mildly. The first pushes will come from counter-state groups, which the state classifies as asocial. It’s better to prepare for this in advance. So as not to be dumbfounded later.
This, however, is historically typical for Russia. This is in Ukraine: “We went to the Maidan against the bandit!” It’s different in Russia. The British Parliament, the Polish trade union, the Russian gang. If there are any special Russian ways and traditional values, this is it. But even in the Third Reich, the Gestapo had problems with criminal groups that developed into an anti-Nazi underground. Like Hans Steinbrück’s Ehrenfeld Group . Even in Poland in the early 1980s, “Solidarity resistance groups attracted people with criminal records to attack informers and punitive forces.” Discussions later. Now the discipline is like in the army. They understand this better than our guys,” Pyotr Izgarshev, the head of the security wing of the State Defence Organization, frankly explained.
In the past decade, politically motivated arson, attacks on loyalists, and clashes with the police and the National Guard have been generated more than once or twice by this environment. “Zek vs. Z” is a political image of Russian politics. And when a nationalist youth group organized an action of solidarity with the rebellion of the Angarsk correctional colony, a combination of social protest and political protest was modelled. In an organic Russian format.
These institutions never sleep. But they need structuring. The immortal phrase from “It’s Hard to Be a God”: “Not even a year will pass before the Arkanar people will crawl out of their cracks with axes. And I will lead them to beat whoever they need, and not each other and everyone in a row.”
The social weakening of the regime begins from the very bottom. That has already been proven to the contrary (very disgusting) by Prihozhine’s epic. We’ll have to leave behind nonsense like “we can’t do it like they do.” We can’t, but we can’t do it any other way with them. As the 17th passes, it will become even clearer.
