The authors of this article have already published a forecast of Russia’s disintegration, its breakup into several parts, the viability of each of which could be ensured by neighboring states, the logic of external protectorates or management, and access to its own technological and natural resources. Such an approach, of course, does not presuppose either Russia or Putin.
The imperial structure of Russia, long supported by a highly centralized power, mineral wealth and the repressions of the Cheka-NKVD-KGB-FSB, will most likely face an existential crisis as early as 2027-2030, and the main drivers of such an almost violent collapse will be:
- possible military victory of Ukraine, armed by Western allies;
- new military adventures of the Kremlin against NATO countries (Polish, Baltic, Finnish directions of aggression);
- the growth of Russia’s hybrid aggression in Europe;
- hybrid operations or another “SVO” against Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova;
- collapse of oil and gas prices;
- disparities in Russia’s war-torn death economy , including Moscow’s constant plundering of the regions and depriving them of their remaining powers;
- increased sanctions and further loss of traditional markets for oil, gas and LNG due to the global transition to renewable energy sources or the discovery of new alternative sources;
- fear of entrepreneurs in the face of nationalization or seizure of assets by the prosecutor;
- consolidation of the West against Russian aggression and the elimination of the real root cause of its aggression.
It is these drivers or their combination that can give a quick start to centrifugal forces inside the Russian Federation. Forces similar to those that led to the collapse of the USSR (today this historical fact is also denied in the Kremlin ) can manifest themselves inside Russia, for example, according to the model of the Polish ” Solidarity ” of the 1980s.
So, Tyumen, Khanty-Mansiysk, Yamalo-Nenets regions, rich in hydrocarbons, form a country under the protectorate of the UN, similar to the UAE, for the fair management of natural resources in the interests of all of Eurasia.
The North Caucasus will be divided between 2-3 powerful players, most likely Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and possibly the Orenburg region (if it does not go to Kazakhstan), which have a diversified economy based on the oil, chemical, automobile industries and powerful agriculture, will create an autonomous confederation and break away from the Kremlin.
The Russian part of the Arctic will receive the status of a special UN protectorate or will be transferred to the international management of seven Arctic countries.
Yakutia, rich in diamonds and gas, and Buryatia, as the keeper of the entire periodic table, are reorienting themselves toward China in search of economic stability, as is Tuva, which still remembers its statehood, as is Krasnoyarsk Krai, “equal to four Frances.”
Karelia, which was historically Finnish before the cession of territories by Finland in 1940, will reunite with it and will get back Vyborg; perhaps Komi will ask to join it as well.
Kaliningrad will become Königsberg or Korolevets and will ask to join the FRG or Poland.
The Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions and, possibly, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug will receive a protectorate from Norway and Great Britain.
Ukraine will gain control over Kursk and Belgorod, possibly Bryansk, and part of the Don basin in the Rostov and Voronezh regions.
The Ural Republic (Sverdlovsk, Perm, Chelyabinsk regions) and the Cossack Republic (the remaining part of the Rostov and Voronezh regions, Krasnodar and Stavropol Krai) will appear.
The Baikal regions, the Far East and Primorye will be separated into a separate entity as a result of ethnic and economic self-determination or will receive a protectorate from China.
All these regions will receive an independent and, we hope, happy destiny of their own, not dependent on the Kremlin, its idols and demons.
And Central Russia, most of the Volga and Northwestern Federal Districts, form the Confederation of Muscovy (hereinafter CM) – a democratic non-imperial entity of 30+ regions with an area of about 1.5 million km² and a population of 50–60 million people, comparable in size and ambitions to Spain, Colombia and South Africa. Let us consider this scenario in more detail.
Territorial Order Reimagined
We named this future country after pre-imperial Muscovy , which existed before Russia’s expansionist ambitions, so that it would look like a triumph of breaking with its difficult totalitarian past. It will unite Moscow and its region, St. Petersburg and its region, as well as Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk, Lipetsk, Oryol, Ryazan, Smolensk (if it does not want to join Belarus and then Lithuania along with it), Tambov, Tver, Tula, Yaroslavl regions, as well as the Kalmyk, Mari, Mordovian, Udmurt and Chuvash republics, Astrakhan, Volgograd, Kirov, Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk regions and Perm Krai, and also the Vologda, Novgorod and Pskov (if it does not want to join Estonia) regions.
The CM will be part of a joint EU-UN protectorate for the first decades. Modeled on Switzerland, the CM will grant significant cultural and national autonomy to the republics – Kalmyk, Mari, Mordovian, Udmurt, but also to other regions that wish it on the basis of controlled self-determination. The CM constitution, developed by UN experts, will function under EU supervision and will certainly ensure democratic governance, while multiple international and country-specific (Ukraine will create its own) tribunals will dismantle the FSB “face-nomics”, which will resemble the denazification of Germany after 1945. Belarus, freed from the power of Lukashenko and the KGB, will become an independent state and integrate into the EU, strengthening the non-imperial identity of the CM as a regional partner, and not yesterday’s hegemon.
Comparative characteristics of KM
The area of Muscovy will be about 1.5 million km² (which corresponds to the combined territory of Germany, France, Spain and Switzerland), and the population will be 50-60 million people, which is comparable to the figures for South Africa (1.22 million km², 64 million people, GDP of $403 billion) and Colombia (1.14 million km², 53 million people, GDP of $420 billion), and its economic power will be comparable to Spain, a significant part of the EU (506,000 km², 48 million people, GDP of $1.7 trillion). Similar to the transition in South Africa from a resource economy to a financial (Johannesburg) and industrial (Gauteng) orientation, parallel reforms will take place in the CM, where the powerful petrochemical cluster of Volgograd or Samara is approximately equal in size to the industrial cluster of Gauteng. Colombia’s diversified agriculture (coffee, flowers, bananas, cocoa beans) and trade (Caribbean and Pacific ports ) are similar to the giant agribusinesses of Volgograd and Saratov and the ports of St. Petersburg; global integration will keep the states from disintegrating. Decentralized governance in Spain, with its autonomous regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country (and the historical claims to independence of Galicia, Aragon, the Canary Islands) will serve as a model for the power of the regional parliaments of the CM, although Spain’s smaller size limits purely territorial parallels.
A diversified economy, democratic institutions and global partnerships can stabilize confederations after the transition period, confirming the effectiveness of the democratic experiment in the CM and offering a plan for its sustainability that has trump cards in the form of economic drivers.
Economic Drivers in the Post-Resource Era
KM will have to move from oil and gas dependence to a diversified economy: it will lose most of Russia’s hydrocarbon regions. But Moscow will remain the financial and technological center for the entire former Russian Federation and will use its skilled labor force to attract international companies.
St. Petersburg with its ports on the Baltic Sea will remain a trade gateway for the export of machinery, metallurgy and agricultural products, fertilizers and chemicals to global markets. Industrial centers such as Nizhny Novgorod (nuclear cluster, automobile manufacturing, oil refining), Samara (aerospace industry, petrochemicals, aircraft manufacturing), Cherepovets (Vologda region, steel cluster), Novgorod (fertilizer production) will continue to develop production; the petrochemical and chemical clusters of Volgograd, where Lukoil oil refineries and Kaustik production are located, will strengthen their export potential, using the status of the Volga transshipment hub with a sharp increase in the influence of river shipping on the Volga. The powerful agriculture of the Volgograd, Oryol, Tambov and Saratov regions will ensure food security, producing grain and livestock products for the domestic and Eurasian markets. Tver will invest in wind and solar power, attracting EU funding to support the transition to green energy. Despite a 30-50% reduction in GDP due to the loss of oil and gas revenues, trade agreements with the EU, IMF loans and Japanese technology partnerships in the KM regions will facilitate their rapid recovery and integration into the global economy. Again, we can cite the example of the EU-integrated economy of Spain, where diversified industries and global integration have mitigated economic problems after the fall of Franco, offering a historic opportunity to position KM as a viable regional player playing polycentrism at the level of Barça .
Metaphysics of the Fugitive Center and the Political Maturity of Political Centristism
The Russian past is not a saga of the power of victorious centralism, as it is often presented in school textbooks and presidential articles , but rather a history of the wandering core of the nation, its tossing and turning, its inability to hold and fix the center – politically, spiritually, geographically: Kiev, Chernigov, Vladimir, Moscow, Petersburg, Moscow again… Each new center arose not as a consensus, but as the violence of a certain ruling group, not as a support, but as an overlap of the previous one, while never finally gaining a foothold. This architecture of instability was masked by the myth of “one and indivisible”, although in fact imperial Russia was always a country of a fugitive center, an elusive identity, that is, a territorial impostor the size of a sixth of the globe. That is why every time a crisis arose, it was first and foremost a crisis of the center.
From the Time of Troubles to October, from the putsch of 1991 to Putin’s ” zeroing out ” of 2020, it was not the peripheries that tore the empire apart, but the center that rusted, trembled, and crumbled. Moscow is not the “natural core” of the empire, but became so through administrative usurpation, through the destruction of the merchant power and veche democracy of Novgorod and Pskov, after the withering of Suzdal, Kazan, Yaroslavl, through the forced zeroing out of other opportunities and vectors of national consolidation.
And now, when everything is ready to collapse again, we must finally admit: there is no single center and, perhaps, there should not be. The Muscovy Confederation is not just a geographical project, but a rejection of a sacred point on the map and in history, an admission that stability can be not in the vertical, but in multiplicity, without an imperial core, without an axis, without a throne. Instead, there are Volgograd, Samara, Pskov, Vologda, Nizhny, Kaluga, Novgorod – cities that existed for centuries without Kremlin fanaticism, without ceremonial sacredness, but with a deep social fabric.
This is not decentralization “in the name of the beauty of diversity,” but perhaps the only way to survive in conditions where the center, forever synonymous with tyranny, can no longer be a moral compass. The rejection of the center is not chaos, but a redistribution of responsibility and a successful model that has long been used by Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, and even the United States, where powerful states do not allow the capital to command their culture or economy.
Russia has never been able to build a federation because the rulers have an empire with a bloodsucker center. A confederation could be a chance for the first anti-imperial form of government in Russian history, where differences are legalized and uniformity does not require violence.
And this is more than a political model – here is a metaphysical turn, a rejection of the myth of a single center, of a single source of meaning. It is time to admit that one can and should live with many voices: when everything is decided at the center, the structure is very unreliable and collapses as soon as the center begins to waver.
And if power is distributed, if identity is scattered across territories, cultures, languages, then the fall of one city does not mean the death of the country. The Muscovy Confederation is not the transfer of the capital, but the liquidation of the very idea of the capital as a sacred zone, a place for bringing tribute and kickbacks, a place for worshiping idols.
Decentralization as a guarantor of political stability
So the KM’s political survival will depend on a decentralized structure that prevents Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Kostroma from asserting dominance. Regional parliaments in Penza, Pskov, Saratov, or Udmurtia will manage local budgets, education, and cultural policy, balancing the influence of large urban agglomerations such as Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, Samara, or St. Petersburg. A UN-drafted constitution will create a weak central government with a rotating president and a bicameral legislature that provides representation to the regions, similar to the cantons of Switzerland. Elections, supervised by the UN for decades, will introduce democratic accountability for those elected, and anti-corruption courts will prosecute elites with ties to the FSB everywhere under lustration laws , bolstering the confidence of international investors.
Educational reforms in the Mari and Kalmyk Republics will promote cultural pluralism, counteracting imperial nostalgia by investing in the regional identity of Mari Ugric traditions or Kalmyk Buddhist heritage – instead of a distorted “Russian” narrative. This pluralistic approach, supported by EU cultural and other integration programs, will strengthen social cohesion, with the 50-60 million citizens of the CM forming a single but diverse state capable of upholding the best practices of democratic governance.
Capitulation, denazification and complete renunciation of the army
Russia’s political and ethical defeat in the war against Ukraine is not an episode, but a moment of truth, which will reveal not the army’s weakness, but the emptiness and criminality of the imperial idea. This war was almost inevitable , almost mathematically derived from the entire previous Russian-Kremlin ideological construction: an empire always comes to a moment when its power machine ceases to serve defense and begins to serve itself. At this moment, it collapses. The collapse of the Russian Federation will not occur at the front, but in the recognition that the ideology of centralized superiority is dead, just as the death of the communist idea ruined the USSR.
The political and tactical victory of Ukraine, even with the technical temporary loss of part of the territory, is the dismantling of the deep Kremlin-Lubyanka paradigm, in which war is the sacred core of the state. The CM cannot preserve the army, because the army is not just a structure, but a psychosis, an obsession with territorial acquisitions, resource games and intimidation of neighbors. The CM will arise as a consequence of technical capitulation, even if no one calls it that: no peace agreement, no compromise, but recognition of an essential defeat.
The defeat will not be that foreign troops will enter Moscow, it will simply lose the right to command, and from that moment the vector will change to the opposite. The entire structure of power can be dismantled under the supervision of an alliance of domestic and international institutions. The armed forces will be liquidated, the nuclear arsenal will be placed under UN control or under a special international management regime – civil defense services and international observation missions will remain , as in post-war Germany, Bosnia, or Cambodia – not temporarily, not transitionally, but institutionally. There will be a strict ban on the re-creation of the army, and not because “it interferes with the economy”, but because in this territory the army has ceased to be an instrument of defense and has become a symbol of repression, aggression, falsified pride and militaristic lies. If at least one army school is left, the parade and parade ground formations will return, and the parade is the cult of Victory, and the cult of Victory means that soon
The Muscovy Confederation will not be a continuation of the war – neither in symbols, nor in architecture, nor in textbooks. And the victory in World War II was common, including those countries that are not part of Russia today: Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and those countries that were allies , such as the USA and Great Britain…
Russia’s sovereignty has always meant the right to kill one’s own and others, not the right to defend. Someone will say: this is impossible, how without an army? – but Germany, too, “never” could give up its army – nevertheless, it gave it up and after 1945 became the most stable democracy in Europe and the third largest economy in the world, because it recognized: the army is a complete narrative, and it is worth destroying.
The KM must begin its history with a complete military void, with total disarmament before its neighbors, Europe and the world. And perhaps it is in this void that the first chance for real peace in Europe will be.
Resilience and regional dynamics
Economic and environmental sustainability will underpin the long-term viability of the KM. Moscow and St Petersburg could develop into technology hubs with a high concentration of manufacturing a la Taiwan or Singapore and a strong financial sector a la Switzerland or the Netherlands. Volgograd’s chemical exports, leveraging its industrial base, and sustainable fisheries in the Volga Delta will strengthen local economies, reducing urban-rural inequality. Kaluga, Vladimir and Ryazan are investing in green industries – waste recycling, green manufacturing – to address environmental degradation inherited from Soviet-era industrialisation. Renewable energy projects in Tver, supported by EU grants, will reduce carbon emissions, in line with global climate goals. The old Russian cities of the Golden Ring , with their strong industrial potential, will prosper, including through tourism.
Socially, Moscow’s tech sector and industrial jobs in Nizhny Novgorod and other million-plus cities will retain young people and reduce brain drain, while cultural initiatives in Vologda, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, and Novgorod will preserve regional heritage by fostering pride in the distinct local identity of Russians. The confederation’s labor market, supported by a population comparable to that of South Africa, will be a driver of innovation and growth. Decentralized governance ensures that regions such as Pskov, close to the Baltics, and Smolensk, bordering Belarus, will meet local needs (agriculture in Pskov, a trade and logistics hub in Smolensk) while promoting national stability, making KM similar to the regional resilience of post-apartheid South Africa. One of the most important infrastructure projects of the KM could be a total restructuring of the topology of the power grids, as well as the heating, water supply and sanitation networks according to the European model, or perhaps surpassing it. Another such project could be a multimodal transport and logistics corridor Moscow-St. Petersburg with an attraction zone of 35 million people, which will make these regions economically prosperous and establish the self-sufficiency of the KM.
Place in the global world
Muscovy in the UN will adopt a neutral international position on the Austrian model, integrating with the EU as a buffer state between NATO countries and former Soviet spheres of influence. UN mediation will help ease tensions with its neighbors – Belarus, which will become a member of the EU and NATO, and Ukraine (which will also join the EU and NATO) over border demarcation, while UN forces will ensure the security of nuclear arsenals, reducing the risks of their unauthorized proliferation.
KM will be comparable to countries such as Argentina or Kenya in terms of investment attractiveness and development prospects.
By prioritizing diplomacy over revanchism, the CM will redefine its role and, without any imperial ambitions, will become a major regional player, ready for cooperation and supported by global institutions and infrastructural trade corridors. Its position between Europe and Asia will establish the CM as a transit and buffer zone between Europe and diverse (from Kazakhstan and China to Pakistan and Afghanistan) Asia.
Language, citizenship and the architecture of trust
The Russian language will remain in Muscovy; it will not disappear from Vologda, Ulyanovsk, or Pskov. But it will no longer be a weapon, it will not be a justification for “influence,” “zone of interests,” or “geopolitical presence.” It will lose its aggressive legitimacy, it will cease to be the language of war, and perhaps, finally, it will become what it really is: simply a language—of communication, trade, technical coordination, literature without malicious claims to uniqueness.
And in other parts of Russia that have defined themselves without Moscow, the Russian language will be a significant part of the linguistic landscape, but rather following the example of Spain, whose mother tongue is spoken by its former colonies (more than 20 countries), and will no longer become an instrument of consolidation and violence.
For decades, the Kremlin has been poisoning the very idea of language: if they speak Russian, it means they are “Russians,” it means “ours,” and wherever these “ours” are located – in Cyprus, Israel, Ukraine, or Estonia – they are always serfs and tools of Moscow. This was not only a lie, but also cultural slavery. The Russian language was not an infrastructure, but rather a colonial radioactive trace, and that is why it must be liberated not from others, but from itself. Because language is not a right to territory, but a means of communication. And at the same time, it is precisely this language, thanks to its deep roots, that will allow the KM not to collapse, and will remain the language of interregional communication. Perhaps regional languages will return – not as a “tradition,” but as a political reality. Tatar, Mari, Kalmyk, Chuvash, Moksha, Udmurt and dozens of others will be restored as full-fledged channels of education, legal proceedings, media, parliamentary and municipal work – but not as a gesture of mercy.
Citizenship of the Muscovy Confederation will cease to be an act of submission, but will become an act of ethical choice: you are not a subject of the state, but the state is responsible to you; you are not the one who must prove your loyalty, but the state is obliged to earn your trust. This is a revolution that no version of Russia has been able to accomplish in the last three hundred years. Citizenship in the CM will not be built on ethnicity, origin, great-power illusion or symbolism, but on structures of trust – elections with international observation, independent courts (formed from below and through elections), and transparent budgets distributed locally by elected parliaments.
The Confederation will not be a set of regions, but an agreement that the center no longer has the right to lie, that force no longer justifies language, that a passport is not a sacred thing, but a multilateral agreement, and if it is violated, then the citizen must have the right to say: I am no longer with you. Such attempts were made after the collapse of the USSR, but they were all strangled by Moscow.
Desacralization of the empire
One of the greatest deformations that has occurred in Russia in recent decades has been the symbiosis of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Kremlin and Lubyanka and their transformation into an instrument of state ideology – we have called it idolology . Orthodoxy, once perceived as the spiritual fabric of Russian life, has become death-worship, an appendage of the military machine, a paralyzed structure that has rejected the Gospel in favor of “strengthening sovereignty” and “fighting foreign agent Satanism.” The Moscow Patriarchate, which traces its history back to Stalin’s meeting with three metropolitans, has finally turned into a spiritual-power structure by the 2020s.
The inevitable death of idolology as a form of state power and religion will not be a reform, but a collapse: those who serve the authorities will disappear along with them. After the collapse of the Russian Federation, the religious field will open up, and this gap will not be patched up by a meeting of bishops or the allocation of new subsidies to a candle factory in the Yaroslavl region. Instead of a single control “spiritual bond in the head”, a pluralistic space will open up in which faith will cease to be a function and division of state security. Orthodox dioceses and metropolitanates will be able to gain real autocephaly. Ukraine will consolidate the logical and original independence of its church not only formally, but also geopolitically. Foreign parishes from the Balkans to America will either finally break ties with the Moscow center, or return to the Constantinople leadership, completely uncorrupted by the empire, that is, the CM in the post-imperial format will not have a church monopoly, and this is not a tragedy, but a cure.
The same will happen to Islamic institutions: the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM), built by the Kremlin to control the ummah , will fall apart, and will be replaced by networks of independent muftiates linked to international educational centers – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Iran in some places. In Tatarstan, Islam will once again become the political language of regional subjectivity, and in Bashkortostan – a support for legal resistance to imperial thinking. And even Buddhism, long erased from the map of the Kremlin’s consciousness, will speak again – in Kalmykia, Buryatia, Tuva, where the memory of Genghis Khan, Buddha, and national identity was suppressed by the Russification project. Mongolia, Tibet, China, and Buddhist Japan will provide alternative cultural vectors, and what was previously considered marginal will become a new point of religious and national assembly.
It is precisely in religious liberation that the main ethical turning point will occur – the rejection of the state as a quasi-religious totem, of religion as propaganda, the rejection of the “shepherds” imposed by force, who blessed torture, wars, bombings, and of course, the complete rejection of the Kremlin idols. KM will not become a secular state in the aggressive French sense, but will be pluralistic, open to difference, to decentralization, to the cutting off of the sacred from the fascistoid.
Memory as a Threat: The Refusal of Continuity and the Political Honesty of Disintegration
One of the most cynical techniques of Russian propaganda is erasing the very fact of the collapse of the ” country that does not exist”. The Kremlin consistently, year after year, pretends that the USSR did not collapse, but simply changed its name, and that Russia is the USSR, that it was the winner in 1945, survived the Cold War, and therefore it is the historical subject, the heir to the entire global burden of the 20th century and further into history. And if someone dares to doubt it, they will immediately start talking about “legal succession”, about the “unity of destinies”, about “inseparable statehood”. But all this is a total lie, which the characters of Orwell’s novels already envy, and deep inside the system they understand this perfectly well, that if we have already collapsed once, then we can collapse again, ” we can repeat it”. Therefore, the very memory of the collapse of the USSR is considered dangerous, and it should not be allowed into school textbooks, but should be replaced by the myth of a “great Russia”, of “continuation”, of a “return home” or a “historical mistake” at worst, denying the right of peoples to self-determination. By the way, even the right of “peoples to self-determination” was turned into a weapon by the Kremlin, if you look closely at the referendums in Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk, and other places.
This is where KM will appear – not as a new Russia, but as an anti-Russia, not as a restoration, but as an admission that the house has already collapsed, and a new one can only be built on the site of the cleared ruins. KM will not be a successor to the Russian Federation – neither legally, nor ideologically, nor mentally, it will not take responsibility for the Kremlin’s crimes, it will not celebrate a special “victory” in World War II, it will not swear allegiance to the past, because this is where the main threat lies – in continuation, in succession, in the illusion that something from this hell can be preserved by simply repainting the walls or putting a tinfoil hat on your head. Muscovy, we will say again, is a rupture, not only political, but also memorial, narrative, symbolic, where instead of museums of “military glory” there will be museums of memory, pain, violence, genocide, the Holocaust, organized by the Kremlin over many centuries.
Instead of “heroic parades” there will be public hearings, open archives, erasing lies, because this is precisely the ethics of rejecting imperial thinking, not in saying: “Russia was bad”, but in not allowing a repeat of the terrible pattern of its behavioral actions, which first led to the collapse of the USSR, and which will now lead to the collapse of Russia. A state that has experienced collapse as a result of a systemic defeat, a historical capitulation, can no longer call itself “great”, it can only be honest. This is precisely why KM will not unite around victory, heroism or past greatness, but will unite around the future, which is possible only with a complete break with the previous anthropology of the Kremlin’s anthropomorphic monsters. That future, where being a citizen does not mean wearing a flag, but bearing responsibility, where being a state does not mean having enemies all around the territory and deep throughout history, but having a memory. The Muscovy Confederation will not become a “better Russia,” will not lay claim to the legacy of flags, anthems, weapons and destinies, not a single document will begin with the words “we are the heirs, the successors”… It will not be a “new hope for great nations and ethnic groups that have learned to live together in a new way,” but will become a harsh but honest consequence of disintegration – and therefore, for the first time, a chance for another difficult and free existence for Russians, if they are even worthy of it.
Historical Parallels and the Democratic Horizon
To provide a model for its creation and rebirth from the aggressive imperialism of the Russian Federation, the Confederation will rely on historical precedents. The collapse of the USSR in 1991, when economic collapse and nationalist movements led to the fragmentation of the empire, represents a direct parallel with Tatarstan’s struggle for sovereignty in the 1990s, which foreshadowed today’s regional autonomy.
The federalism of Germany after 1945, imposed by the Allies, is a model for the democratization of the CM, carried out by the EU and the UN, with the guarantee of eliminating the authoritarian legacy of the FSB through legal and institutional reforms.
It will be important for KM to show the world that the collapse of an empire can produce not chaos, but liberation.
***
The specific mechanisms of Russia’s denazification , ethnogenesis , the functioning of protectorates and the management of the risks of the unity of the nuclear complex will be the subject of our separate consideration. It seems to us that neither the ” good Russians” nor the responsible émigré “foreign centers” (Berlin, Paris, London, Vilnius, Helsinki, New York, etc.), probably consciously (like Vladimir Milov, who “put an end” to this issue) are not conducting this long-overdue conversation, are not opening a discussion on the options for the disintegration of Russia, which cannot be explained only by the grants received from Western sources, but is quite well explained by their infiltration by agents of Lubyanka, Yasenevo and Khoroshevka.
The West, and first of all the USA, never admitted to themselves that the USSR was about to collapse, believing that at the very least the control of nuclear weapons should definitely remain on the conscience of the Union at any cost. Although, of course, there were discussions and sober voices, for example , the head of the Office of Management and Budget of the George Bush Sr. administration, Richard Darman (it is not for nothing that after leaving the White House he became the managing director of The Carlyle Group ). The same fears, one and the same, today paralyze the will of the West when they talk about the collapse of Russia.
It is probably time to stop the idealistic thoughts about the possibility of the world’s last territorial empire emerging from itself, without the collapse of the rest of the world. It worked once, it will work a second time.
It needs to be repeated.
