Agenda of Andropov’s Complex Path
The first task that Andropov has ahead of him is to strengthen his position in power. He faces challenges with many internal and external problems.
Now that Andropov has taken power in the Kremlin, the issue of governance becomes increasingly complex. Andropov has seized power at a critical historical juncture for Russia. Brezhnev, the former leader, left behind a strong military power, but Andropov, like Ronald Reagan, faces the challenge of neutralizing Russian enemies.
Internally, Andropov confronts many problems inherited from Brezhnev, such as a decline in agricultural and industrial production. There are also external challenges, like the unrest in Poland, the failure in Afghanistan, and the unpopularity of Russia in the Middle East, all legacies from Brezhnev.
Beyond these challenges, a significant danger lies ahead: When Andropov extends his rule, he will have to balance internal issues with external adventures, especially in Russia’s foreign engagements. If he does not act accordingly, the Russian military will force him into these decisions. Andropov, being a pragmatic leader, will likely face decisions that will determine whether he adopts a more authoritarian or liberal approach, particularly regarding Afghanistan, Poland, and even domestic opposition.
His future relations with the United States may improve, but this will depend on his approach to liberalization and his handling of military affairs. If he reaches an agreement with Communist China, it could lead to a significant alliance that would extend Russia’s influence from the East, creating the largest global bloc since 1910.
Additionally, if he dares to implement economic reforms, this could improve living conditions and create favorable international relations. However, as noted, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain.
“Andropov’s First Mission”
His first mission is to consolidate his own power. Although executing this task may seem difficult, Andropov can easily and quickly achieve it by gaining the support and backing of the Politburo members. This is possible because he was able to secure the majority of votes from the 12 members of the Politburo.
Andropov’s goal is to secure the trust of the general public of the Communist Party. The Politburo consists of 15 members, but currently, there are only 13 active members. Among them, Andrei Kirilenko, aged 76, is seeking retirement, while another member, Erwid Belski (?), is 80 years old and continues to serve. Therefore, the number of members in the Politburo will likely decrease to around 10 members in the near future.
This situation actually works in Andropov’s favor, as it will allow him to include five of his newly chosen members in the Politburo. The benefit of this change is clear: three of the current members live in cities outside of Moscow and rarely attend the weekly sessions in Moscow.
The result of Andropov’s first test of power will be determined by how quickly he can include his preferred individuals in the Politburo. It’s possible that Andropov may appoint a new head of the KGB. The candidate for this position could be someone like Vitaliy Fedorchuk or General Marshal Nikolai Okrov (?).
No one knows for sure how long Andropov will stay in power, but from the beginning of his reign, it is clear that he will need to prepare both domestic and foreign policies.
1. Convincing the Generals:
Andropov’s first challenge will be convincing the military generals. The Russian army has always wanted to maintain a balanced power status, similar to that of the American military. The Americans spend about 7% of their national gross income on military expenditures. However, the Russians spend 120-130 percent of their Gross National Income on military affairs, which places a severe economic burden on the people of Russia. Russia, in comparison to the United States, is more susceptible to disarmament because its Gross National Income is half of that of the United States, yet Russia still competes with the U.S. military by spending large sums of money on its army. This immense spending puts a significant strain on the economy.
Brezhnev, before his death, said that the Russian military could meet any of its needs under any economic conditions, meaning that unfavorable economic conditions should not affect military expenditures. There is a possibility that Andropov may face difficulty in managing this issue. The Russians have previously felt surrounded by hostile forces and think of themselves as being encircled by Western enemies, Muslim fundamentalists, and even other communist nations like China. These concerns push Russia to compete militarily with the United States.
Andropov also has another reason for maintaining the military budget: his own political survival. There have always been tensions between the KGB and the Russian military, which forces Andropov to ensure the loyalty of the generals to secure his position. History shows that Russian generals hold considerable power over politicians, and politicians cannot ignore them. For example, in 1957, when Khrushchev attempted to reduce the number of soldiers, he faced opposition from military generals who removed him from power. Brezhnev avoided such mistakes, and it is likely that Andropov will not make them either.
One expert on Russian affairs predicted that by the end of the century, Russia may turn into a military dictatorship. In this case, the new Russian ruler will need at least five years to consolidate power. During this time, either the military will intervene, or someone else will intervene to take control. Andropov must convince the generals that the security of the state depends on more than just military power; it also requires economic and industrial reforms. These reforms will help Russia compete with the United States qualitatively.
Russians learned from the recent events in Lebanon that having missiles in storage is useless because a U.S. airplane can destroy them without any risk. Another expert suggests that Andropov may need to persuade the military that without economic improvement, military quality cannot improve. However, generals may not be willing to reduce military spending.
The fear of NATO deploying many of its nuclear missiles in Western Europe is a key point in Russian foreign policy. This could start in 1983, and Andropov may work toward modernizing and strengthening medium-range nuclear missiles in response. This could be a reaction to NATO’s steps, which are seen as an attempt to disrupt the balance of power in Europe. Brezhnev opposed the placement of these missiles, and it is likely that Andropov will avoid making similar mistakes.
In Afghanistan, Andropov faces a difficult situation. If the Soviets withdraw, it could be seen as a defeat for Brezhnev’s legacy. However, the withdrawal could improve relations with other countries, especially Muslim nations like Iran. The Soviets have adopted a defensive stance in Afghanistan, where they have suffered heavy losses. The situation may push Russia to start negotiations about Afghanistan, signaling a major shift in Russian foreign policy.
Communists in China have also started negotiations with Russia to restore relations, and Andropov may continue Brezhnev’s policies toward China. However, Russia faces economic problems, and it may struggle to keep up with other nations like Romania, which is seeking better economic cooperation with Russia. As Andropov solidifies his power, his policies may change to accommodate the new realities of Eastern Europe.
Domestically, Andropov has managed to suppress internal opposition, but he will eventually need to allow some degree of freedom to intellectuals and reformers. His approach will be to encourage reform while maintaining control over the political system. Andropov is likely to face opposition from both his internal critics and external forces, but he will need to manage these challenges carefully.
In conclusion, Andropov is a highly skilled politician who must navigate complex issues related to military spending, foreign relations, and domestic reforms. His ability to maintain control while addressing the challenges facing Russia will define his leadership.
Translation from Farsi by Emilia Pawliuk
Архів ОУН. - Бібліотека. - Неперіодичні видання. - Публікації моджахедів Афганістану / Islamic Union of Mujahideen of Afghanistan Official Publication. - С.1.
