Whatever its impact elsewhere, the Russian aggression in Czecho-Slovakia is unlikely to cause more than a ripple in South-East Asia.
The first feeling of dismay and disillusion is already giving way to a cool reassessment of the possible consequences of Moscow’s search for friends in this region. Since the first purposeful overtures were made some two years ago, Soviet-Russian diplomacy has made tangible headway in the area.
There have been no indications yet that Soviet Russia’s preoccupation with developments in Czecho-Slovakia would lead to a slackening of its efforts in Southeast Asia or that the countries of this area would be less forthcoming in developing contacts with Moscow.
Russian determination to consolidate its fairly strong foothold in Singapore and Malaysia was demonstrated when the first Soviet trade exhibition was held in Singapore in early September. Even the few university students who had demonstrated in front of the Soviet Trade Mission soon after the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia chose to ignore this event.
The Singapore government which had expressed profound sympathy for the Czecho-Slovak nations and taken an indirect swipe at the Soviet Union, (“…we are shocked and dismayed by policies where right is no more than a display of might”) has not let these sentiments interfere with trade. The Russians reported with satisfaction after the week-long exhibition that several contracts had been concluded.
In the other direction, Singapore has found encouraging markets in the Soviet Union and East Europe for its products, such as shoes, beer, etc.
The exhibition will now go to Kuala Lumpur, where the Soviet diplomatic presence is much stronger.
For Malaysia, the Soviet Union is the best customer for natural rubber, the country’s lifeblood. Given the fierce competition posed by synthetic rubber, Malaysia needs to preserve and expand the market for its natural rubber. Russia had been a big buyer even before, but the old concept of a distant buyer (operating mainly through the London market and intermediaries in Singapore), who, in any case, wanted the precious raw material, has given way to one of a friend who not only trades but is prepared to give aid and develop social and cultural contacts.
The Malaysian government was quick to express its “deep concern and regrets” at the Russian invasion, but while advocating the withdrawal of Russian troops, it stopped short of condemning Moscow.
In Indonesia, where the official reaction to the Russian move was more guarded than the outright condemnation by some political parties and students, both sides seem content with the pace of progress in the rehabilitation of their relations.
The Philippines, which decided just before the Czecho-Slovak incident to pursue a cautious policy of gradual establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, does not seem likely to reverse the process although the tempo might have slowed down slightly.
Neither has Thailand shown any signs of wanting to do more than register its disapproval of Russian occupation.
As far as the Communist states are concerned, North Vietnam has come out pat on Moscow’s side while North Korea has indirectly supported the Soviet-Russian action by condemning the “counter-revolutionaries” in Czecho-Slovakia. Hanoi’s attitude is understandable given its massive dependence on Soviet economic and military aid.
It was not in considerations of trade and commerce alone, although these are substantial, that have contributed to the preservation of the Soviet-Russian image in South-East Asia as an affable, reasonable regime willing to coexist with non-Communist and even anti-Communist states.
Apart from trade and economic considerations, most of the Southeast Asian countries look to the Soviet-Russian presence in the area as a stabilizing and perhaps a bargaining factor in the constantly changing balance of power. Having accepted the reality of a complete British withdrawal by 1971, the countries are inclined to look upon an active Soviet interest in the area as a balancing influence against the threats from a nuclear China.
Quite apart from the susceptibilities felt while coping with big power manoeuvres, most of the Southeast Asian countries do not tend to look upon the “disciplining” of Czecho-Slovakia as a case of naked aggression, because of the strategic Soviet-Russian interests involved. They are also slightly cynical at the muted reaction of the United States and are inclined to attribute the developments at least partly to the evil system of carving out areas of influence between the big powers.
Not surprisingly, Peking’s vociferous protests against the Russian invasion and lavish expression of sympathy for the Czecho-Slovakian “people” while condemning the Svoboda-Dubcek leadership, have cut little ice in this region. This is in a large measure due to their innate knack, gained no doubt by bitter experience, to see through this subterfuge. Peking has been very liberal with expressions of support for the “people” of Indonesia, Malaya (it has not taken note of Malaysia yet), Thailand, Burma and the Philippines in their imaginary or real struggle to overthrow their “reactionary” governments. It has also been noted that the present Czecho-Slovak leadership, whose liberalization moves are regarded with sympathy in this region, has been the target of abuse by Chinese leaders, press and radio.
Burmese, Indonesian and Malaysian charges of China’s interference in their affairs have also not been forgotten. At the same time, none of the Southeast Asian countries has yet experienced anything like it from the Soviet Union.
Hence this discreet approach to a problem on which they would rather not sit in judgement.
After all, a nation, like a man, cannot be too careful in the choice of its enemies.
We — Indian anti-Communists — support the fight for the disintegration of the Russian empire into independent national states of all subjugated nations, as the only guarantee of lasting peace and security in the world!
Rama Swarup
