The main event of the government changes is the dismissal of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was transferred to the Security Council (in place of Nikolai Patrushev Sr.). They found a moment to punish him for the unsuccessful conduct of the war. In his place, civilian economist Andrey Belousov was appointed. He is linked by long-standing contacts with Putin’s close associates Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk. Kovalchuk’s son Boris is now the head of the Accounting Chamber.
The minister may be temporary, but the populism of the fight against corruption and audit, and, the redistribution of rent flows, have significantly decreased. Instead, Gerasimov and the other generals are still in place, and Putin will try to work both aspects through them and directly control the course of the war.
In a Russian-type regime, the importance of institutions depends on the leaders’ personalities and their connection with Putin, so the Security Council will lose its role and become an honorary pension again. A body to which Shoigu was appointed while his key deputies were arrested. First, Shoigu’s deputy Timur Ivanov, later Yuriy Kuznetsov, head of the Main Board of Personnel of the Ministry of Defence. The latter, by authority, was engaged in the fight against corruption – according to Russian custom, he headed it. But Shoigu himself, of course, as a rather symbolic figure, will avoid persecution. Interestingly, he will also coordinate the work of the Military-Industrial Commission in the Security Council. Medvedev, deprived of the remnants of symbolic positions, was engaged in this body earlier.
While Patrushev Sr. gained a lot of potential, he has been the head of the Security Council since 2008. For the past six months, he has been showing ambition, coordinating the work of the governors of the central regions. Now his role is a little weakened, but Putin reckons with him – he is an adviser in the administration, and his son Dmitriy became the deputy prime minister. Most importantly, all the main security forces are in place, except for Shoigu. Bortnikov (the head of the FSB), Zolotov (the head of the Russian National Guard), and the head of the SVR Naryshkin. Bortnikov and Zolotov are creatures of Patrushev. But Belousov and Gerasimov remain his counterweight.
Denys Manturov, a creature of the head of Rostyech Sergey Chemezov, strengthened his position. Now he is the deputy prime minister, Mishustin’s first deputy. Instead, another tower of the Kremlin will lose out – concentrated around the head of Rosneft and oil trade coordinator Igor Sechin, who was unable to promote important figures to the government. They continue to be under pressure to take away income from the export of energy carriers (remember the recent strange deaths of Lukoil’s top managers).
Another important fact is that Anton Alikhanov, who at the young age of 29 in 2016 became the governor of the Kaliningrad region, was appointed to Manturov’s former position, as Minister of Industry and Trade. He is also related to Chyemizov through his relatives’ business. There were even speculations that Putin was promoting him as one of the possible successors. Recently, he became “famous” for his chauvinistic statements about Immanuel Kant. This is not surprising – due to his mixed Greek and Georgian origin, he strongly pretends to be the greatest emperor, becoming a favourite of the most odious Zet channels.
In general, as we can see, in the conditions of a decrease in rent resources and increased internal competition, Putin is trying to maintain a balance, focusing on the balance of several groups (Kovalchuk and Patrushev), with a significant decrease in the group of Sechin and the military (Gerasimov still retains the position of head of the General Staff, but we assume that his role will fall). Individuals who have long been integrated into Putin’s entourage remain – Lavrov, Nabiullina.
But the main fact is that, despite various insiders, the head of the government, Mikhail Mishustin, has not changed. He started as an inconspicuous technocrat and still minimizes radical statements on foreign policy, acting as an “efficient manager”. There are more and more confirmations that Bejing supports him as Putin’s successor, and Putin is forced to reckon with the opinion of his older brother. No wonder the new old government was appointed before Putin’s visit to China on 16-17 May. Almost the entire new government will go with him, and dozens of negotiation meetings at the ministerial level are planned. It can be interpreted as an agreement between the composition of the government and the authorities of the People’s Republic of China.
Yuriy Oliynyk, Candidate of Political Sciences, Director of research programmes of the non-governmental analytical centre “Ukrainian Strategic Research Studies (USRS)”
