On May 19, the president of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi, died in a plane crash. Many government officials were on board the helicopter with him, including Hossein-Amir Abdolakhian, the influential head of the country’s Foreign Ministry. The catastrophe has already caused a political crisis in Iran, but so far it has a hidden character. What to expect from Russia’s Middle Eastern partner? And will the policy of the regime change radically after June 28, the day of the extraordinary presidential elections?
It is worth starting with skepticism. Iran is not just a leadership regime, ringed around the figure of a conditional fuhrer (as in Russia, where without Putin the entire elite consensus will crumble at once). In Iran, leadership is diversified within the ruling elite. This complex regime was formed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
According to the laws, the people elect the parliament, the president and the Assembly of Experts (a special body of 88 people). The president appoints the government (with the support of the parliament).
The exclusive function of the assembly is to elect a new Rakhbar – the Supreme Ayatollah, from a limited circle of the upper Shiite clergy. In theory, it can be removed, but in practice, since 1979, two rulers have changed – Khomeini, and 1989 – Ayatollah Khamenei.
But the rahbar appoints the head of judges, the Expediency Council (advisory body), 6 of the 12 members of the Guardian Council. He also heads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian army, can fire ministers or even the president, and vetoes all decisions of other bodies. The Parliament is also controlled by the Guardian Council. Therefore, the system is complex and diversified, which creates favourable conditions for internal elite struggle. But the main task is ensured – compliance with the ideology of Shiite Islamic rule (in Khomeini’s version), and the country cannot be transferred to a radically different internal course, because the elitists control each other.
On the other hand, the late Raisi was seen as one of the probable successors of the already old Rakhbar Khamenei, who is already 85 years old. Now the fight for the place of the successor will deepen. One of the options is the son of Khamenei, but the rahbar basically limits the place of Mojtaba’s son in high positions during his lifetime, so as not to annoy those around him. First of all, the trans-ethnic principle. Ali Khamenei is an ethnic Azerbaijani, who makes up about a quarter of the country’s population (i.e. 20 million out of 80). And the Iranian majority, in the elite and the population, resists this. After all, during monarchical times, Iran was already ruled by Turkic dynasties for centuries. Ricey was a compromise successor, but he is gone.
The role of the rahbar is, of course, much more influential, and it is his successor who will determine the main features of the future of Iran. However, at the medium-term level, presidents can adjust the general line. For example, Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005-13), despite Israel’s constant threats, took a course to normalize relations with the USA in terms of the so-called “nuclear agreement” – the suspension of the nuclear programme in exchange for lifting part of the sanctions. During the times of Hassan Rouhani (2013-21) and Ibrahim Raisi, on the contrary, we see an increase in confrontation with the USA.
Over the past ten years, during the proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, the role of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has grown disproportionately, becoming a separate force coordinating all proxy groups of Tehran’s allies, from the Houthis to Hezbollah. A significant share of the country’s economy is tied to the Corps, and it has a position to increase confrontation with its neighbours, which primarily benefits the top Corps. Then, as the majority of the people reap economic and, probably, military losses.
The prospects for a grassroots revolution are likely but again inconclusive. We saw mass uncoordinated demonstrations in 2022, primarily for economic reasons. They can be repeated on a smaller scale, the revolutionaries will be inspired by the crisis at the top. But their victory is unlikely. Although they can be used by elite groups – conventional hawks (from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and more moderate ones.
If the more moderates win, we should expect a decrease in support for Russia. However, in reality, Iran has already given most of what it could, giving Russia time to revive the military-industrial complex and transfer technologies (for example, unmanned Iranian-style drones are now being made in Yelabuz, Tatarstan, where Ukrainian guests have flown in). But even a small decrease in support will benefit Ukraine because Iran is an additional trade channel through the Caspian Sea. However, according to the statements, we will not see this, because Tehran already officially rejects Moscow’s direct support.
On the other hand, Beijing’s reaction is important. The latter, of course, controls Iran less than the Russian Federation (as evidenced by the recent mutual missile attacks on the border with Pakistan, another strategic partner of the PRC).
Of course, internal problems in Iran will significantly weaken the anti-Western coalition. But to strengthen them, the political will of our allies is necessary. The Europeans and the US should provide more active support (in 2022 it was insufficient) and communicate with certain elite groups in the face of increasing popular unrest. Moreover, in the next two months, the Iranian elite will be the least interested in external escalation – either with Israel or with the Arab monarchies.
